






































–a¯b	 	 +a										 +b	Here	+	is	an	existence-indicator,	–	is	a	nonexistence-indicator,	and	a¯b	means	‘a	without	b’.	The	rule	thus	reads:	there	is	not	a	without	b;	there	is	a;	therefore,	there	is	
b.	This	rule	for	valid	inference	is	either	to	be	deduced	from	more	basic	rules	or	is	to	be	added	as	a	basic	rule	in	its	own	right.	The	program	is	to	put	in	place	all	the	rules	we	accept	as	valid,	using	a	uniform	formalism,	and	then	prove	consistency	and	completeness.	Although	this	program	has	not	to	my	knowledge	been	fully	carried	out	yet,	see	Terrell	1976	and	Simons	1984,	1987	for	important	contributions.		
Conclusion		Brentano’s	theory	of	judgment	is	so	heterodox	that	it	has	never	made	any	notable	inroads	outside	the	most	entrenched	centers	of	Brentanian	philosophy,	in	Vienna,	Prague,	and	Innsbruck.	Certainly	within	analytic	philosophy	it	was	doomed	by	its	non-propositional	take	on	judgment,	which	greatly	limits	the	possibility	for	informative	linguistic	representation	of	judgments	and	their	content.	Yet	even	if	we	concede	that	propositional	structure	is	much	more	powerful	for	purposes	in	modeling	in	public	language,	the	psychological	reality	of	judgment	need	not	be	so	accommodating	to	our	purposes.	Brentano’s	arguments	that	the	psychological	reality	of	judgment	reveals	an	objectual	existence-affirming	attitude	must	be	contended	with.	As	the	above	brief	discussion	suggests,	these	are	by	no	means	frivolous.2			
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